This essay deals with one of the most basic questions that concern the philosophy of mathematics, which has come to be known as the Continuum Hypothesis. First put forth by Georg Cantor in 1878, the Continuum Hypothesis is a postulate on whether there exists an infinite set of real numbers whose cardinality lies strictly between that of the natural numbers and that of the real numbers themselves. The independence of Continuum Hypothesis from the standard axiomatic system of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the Axiom of Choice was shown by Kurt Gödel and Paul Cohen; the independence has given rise to much interesting philosophical debate about the nature of mathematical truth. This essay argues from a Platonist perspective, maintaining that Continuum Hypothesis must have a determinate truth value, independent of the limitations of formal systems. The essay contrasts this view with formalism, which sees mathematical truths as dependent on the choice of axioms. By drawing historical analogies and examining both Platonist and formalist viewpoints, the paper advocates for the pursuit of new axioms and alternative frameworks—such as large cardinal and forcing axioms—that might ultimately resolve the Continuum Hypothesis. The discussion highlights the broader implications of Continuum Hypothesis for understanding the nature of infinity, the completeness of mathematical systems, and the foundations of mathematics itself.
