A New Response to the Surprise Test Paradox

Authors

  • Yintong Chen Author

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.61173/g1f8n487

Keywords:

Surprise Test Paradox, Epistemology, Logic

Abstract

The Surprise Test Paradox is a renowned epistemic paradox that has puzzled many philosophers for a very long time. A teacher tells the students that there will be a surprise test in the following week, and the students will not know beforehand when the test will occur. However, this quickly leads to a contradiction. First, the test cannot occur on Friday, because if he hasn’t been hanged by Thursday, there is only one day left, so it won’t be a surprise. The test also cannot be on Thursday, since Friday is eliminated and if the test hasn’t taken place by Wednesday, it must take place on Thursday, making the test unsurprising. By similar reasoning, the students could conclude that the test cannot take place on Wednesday, Tuesday, or Monday. Thus, the test cannot happen at all. Yet, the teacher still gives a surprise test on Wednesday, which (despite all of the above) is a total surprise to the students. In this article, I intend to propose a new solution to this paradox and examine the definition of “surprise”, as well as discuss whether or not the student actually believes in the announcement.

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Published

2024-12-31

Issue

Section

Articles