A Criticism of Russell’s Theory of Definite Descriptions

Abstract

Bertrand Russell’s Theory of Definite Descriptions, introduced in his 1905 paper On Denoting, offers a logical framework for analyzing sentences involving definite descriptions, breaking them down into existential and universal quantifiers. While influential, this theory has faced substantial criticism, particularly from P.F. Strawson and Keith Donnellan. This paper critiques Russell’s approach by arguing that it overlooks the role of presupposition and context in ordinary language. Strawson emphasizes how presupposition failures in non-referring descriptions result in truth-value gaps, while Donnellan distinguishes between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions, demonstrating that Russell’s theory inadequately accounts for these linguistic nuances. By examining these criticisms, the paper argues that while Russell’s theory provides a valuable framework for formal logic, it falls short in accurately reflecting the complexity of everyday language use. This analysis explores the ongoing philosophical debate surrounding the relevance of Russell’s ideas and the challenges posed by alternative approaches to definite descriptions.