Based on Davidson’s “Weakness of Will”: The Strength of Will is Irrelevant.

Abstract

As a significant figure in contemporary analytic philosophy, Davidson holds a prominent position in the discourse on the weakness of will. This paper offers an alternative perspective on the issue, using Davidson’s views on the weakness of will as a reference point while challenging his approach. Diverging from the common analysis of the weakness of will in terms of specific behaviors to explain the concept, this paper delves into an analysis of the core issue itself: the will. By examining the rationality behind the concept of will rather than focusing solely on behavioral manifestations, this paper questions the validity of the problem of weakness of will. While it is commonly understood that the will guides behavior, final actions do not always align with the dictates of the will, giving rise to the problem of weakness of will. This paper raises doubts about this problem’s legitimacy and concludes that the subject reflects on their rationality to generate the will. Thus, the will, distinct from desire, emerges after rationality and selects among the results of rational judgment. This choice is free, independent of the dictates of rationality, rendering the will a purely voluntary matter unaffected by strength or weakness.